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Abstract
In theory, the idea of democracy consists of several insoluble contradictions, aporias, and conflicts. In practice, democracy
demands an effective balancing of its essentially opposing principles and values in order to preserve an authentic charac-
ter as well as to avoid its inherent self-destructive tendencies. In this regard, the concept of value trade-offs promises a
heuristic tool to grasp both the analytical and normative impact of a political theory which takes the complexity of democ-
racy seriously. Proceeding from this, the contribution will demonstrate to what extent the conceptualisation of democratic
antinomies and the notion of value trade-offs can be seen as a kind of communicating vessel. The article’s general argu-
ment is that democracy is defined by several antinomies that are irreducible in theory and therefore require trade-offs in
political practice. Moreover, it will discuss three relevant issue areas to suggest the approach’s empirical relevance and
to prove the existence of value trade-offs as an operating benchmark for the legitimacy and consolidation of democratic
processes on the one hand but also for their shortcomings and risks on the other. Correspondingly, the article concerns
the antinomic relationships between freedom and security, economic growth and sustainability, and finally, democracy
and populism to underpin the general perception that the success of democratic institutions first and foremost depends
on the balance of the necessarily conflicting principles of democracy.
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1. Introduction
The intense consideration to the history of political
thought reveals that the concept of democracy is gen-
erally associated with essentially opposing connotations
and values: Liberty and equality, representative govern-
ment and popular sovereignty, the principles of quality
and quantity in respect of democratic decision-making,
plurality and social unity, individual and collective claims,
and last but not least universality and particularity—all
of these evident contradictions inevitably belong to the
idea of modern democracy and therefore provoke a per-
manent struggle of conflicting opinions, interests, and ac-
tors within the democratic system. Hence, the theory of
democracy presented here argues that what is vaguely
called the government of the people, by the people and
for the people is made up of several specific ‘antinomies.’
These antinomies stretch a discursive framework which
can function as an adequate measure to distinguish legit-
imate political efforts from extremist enunciations and
demands exceeding the democratic boundaries by sus-
pending its obligatory opposites and rendering the al-
ways ‘relative’ features of democracy in terms of abso-
lutes. Accordingly, one may say that an ‘authentic’ type
of democracy is primarily characterised by a number
of dynamic trade-offs between its inherent (and insolu-
ble) antinomies.
Proceeding from these preliminary assumptions, the
following line of argument briefly outlines the theory of
democratic antinomies (Section 2), before it clarifies the
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interdependence of these antinomies in theory and the
need of (value) trade-offs in democracy’s political prac-
tice (Section 3). Furthermore, the theoretical considera-
tions should be illustrated by three substantiated exam-
ples, which will be reconstructed in terms of the relevant
concepts in order to highlight both the structural bene-
fits and problems of democratic discourse (Section 4).
2. The Theory of Democratic Antinomies
The history and theory of democracy are surrounded by
numerous inconsistencies, paradoxes and aporias. For
instance, as it is well-known, democracy exhibits a par-
ticular tendency to self-destruct as well as “autoimmu-
nity” (Derrida, 2005), whenever an ‘undemocratic’ group
of political actors attempt to gain the majority of vot-
ers in order to abolish civil rights and democratic institu-
tions with the help of legally implemented ‘democratic’
procedures. An associated problem is a paradox identi-
fied by Richard Wollheim (1962). This paradox means
that democracy is always confronted with the inherent
dilemma that an outvoted minority nevertheless has
to obey the political decisions taken by the representa-
tives of the voters’ majority, even if the outvoted mi-
nority is convinced that the majority is wrong and be-
lieve they have the moral right or even duty to engage
in civil disobedience. This dilemma evidently leads to
the need for, or at least the imagination of there be-
ing, an “overlapping consensus,” in which the existing
political antagonisms of a particular society are symbol-
ically absorbed and therefore effectively defused (e.g.,
Heller, 1928/2000; Rawls, 1993, Chapter 4). A third apo-
ria of democracy is indicated by Kenneth Arrow’s “im-
possibility theorem,” according to which it is not possi-
ble to formulate a consistent social preference ordering
which can simultaneously satisfy the conditions of non-
dictatorship, individual sovereignty, unanimity, freedom
from irrelevant alternatives, and uniqueness of group
rank (Arrow, 1963). Together with John Nash’s (1951) cri-
tique on the “invisible hand” in Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations (1776/2012), Arrow’s impossibility theorem sug-
gests that there is nomethod to extrapolate from individ-
ual preferences to the common good. The same insight
can be drawn from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s description
of the “general will” as “sum of small differences” to peo-
ple’s individual interests (Rousseau, 1997, p. 60). In con-
sequence, therewill always remain a significant incongru-
ence and therefore a deep tension between individual
and collective claims, private interests, and public goods.
The above-mentioned (as well as many other) para-
doxes basically result from one overarching reason: That
democracy as a form of government and society estab-
lished by the principle of competition requires every
claim for (absolute) truth to be renounced (e.g., Arendt,
2007, pp. 223–259; Kelsen, 1955). Ensuing from this, two
things are supposed to emerge: First, the implausibility
to define the concept of democracy unequivocally; and
second, the emphasis on democracy’smultiple identities.
Thus, the almost countless patterns, (sub-)types and va-
rieties of democracy which the history of democratic the-
ory assembles (e.g., Cunningham, 2002; Diamond, 2008;
Dunn, 2005; Eisenstadt, 1999; Held, 2006; Schmidt, 2010;
Tilly, 2007) are not only logical outcomes of the classical
statement byWalter B. Gallie (1956) that democracy—as
justice or the arts—is among the “essentially contested
concepts” lacking unique standards for both a commonly
accepted definition and a consistent discursive practice.
Far from being just an arbitrary political system, it has
to be assumed that a unique characteristic of democ-
racy is that it offers social and political struggles a re-
liable framework and a platform on which their politi-
cal objectives might be transformed into legitimate indi-
vidual and collective claims. This means the concept of
democracy quasi ‘internalises’ the contradictions, oppo-
sitions and antitheses circulating in society. Thereby, the
legitimacy of ‘democratically’ formulated political goals
precisely emanate from the (paradoxical) fact that it ac-
cepts the entitlement of alternative political goals as a
quid pro quo. Otherwise, a ‘democratic’ decision regard-
ing any political conflict would be nothing but absurd.
Against this elaborated theoretical background, even
common distinctions such as those between liberal and
republican, direct and representative, consensus andma-
joritarian (for this distinction, see particularly Lijphart,
1999, Chapters 2–3), market and social democracy, as
well as further discrepancies between elitist and partici-
patory, deliberative and agonistic forms of democracy, or
even strong opposition such as that between grassroots
democracy and democratic leadership or Western and
Non-Western ideas of democracy do not inevitably re-
inforce the popular prejudice that democracy can mean
“everyone and everything” (Sartori, 1992, p. 11). Instead,
the evident coexistence of many divergent conceptions
and notions of democracy just confirms that democ-
racy itself apparently consists of significant paradoxes,
aporias, and contradictions. However, these ‘democratic’
contradictions do not prevent democracy being treated
as an essentially contested concept which nevertheless
has clear contours at its boundaries. Since it seems
to be unmistakable what all legitimate controversies
within democracy are about, the permanent (and es-
sentially indissoluble) political struggles may indeed for-
bid a strict definition of democracy, but allow at least
its theoretical framing as well as a normative estima-
tion of democratic qualities. This approach may neither
be confused with a minimal concept (Dahl, 1971, 1998)
nor with the perception that the concept of democracy
might only be “boundary contested” (Lord, 2004). In con-
trast, we have to become aware of the fact that it is
exactly the special character of conflict giving democ-
racy its distinctive feature. In this respect, first of all
the recognition of plurality, the existence of conflict-
ing opinions and values, and most notably, the integra-
tion of governments’ and oppositions’ rival claims, are
what distinguishes democracy from every other politi-
cal system (Luhmann, 2000). Likewise, this perspective
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sheds new light on democracy’s historical ability to sub-
sume very contrary ideas and realities under its seman-
tic field. In this regard, it is remarkable that the anti-
thetical oppositions commonly associated with democ-
racy, obviously imply a similar level of legitimacy: lib-
erty vs. equality (Antinomy I); representation vs. pop-
ular sovereignty (Antinomy II); the principles of qual-
ity and quantity concerning democratic decision-making
(Antinomy III); plurality vs. social unity (Antinomy IV); in-
dividual vs. collective claims (Antinomy V); and finally,
universality vs. particularity (Antinomy VI). All of these
antagonistic principles and values definitely include an
‘authentic’ side of democracy, even though a perma-
nent clash is bound to occur (Hidalgo, 2014, Chapter 3).
A main consequence of this essential discernment might
be that even profoundly opposing theorists such as
Hobbes and Rousseau, Schumpeter and Barber, Kelsen
and Loewenstein, Dahl and Pateman, Habermas and
Mouffe, Nozick and Taylor, Kant and Derrida, each con-
tribute to a comprehensive understanding of modern
democracy in an appropriate and equitable manner.
The previously outlined characteristics of democracy
can be conceptually grasped by the keyword: antinomy.
With the concept of democratic antinomies going be-
yond the rather indefinite notion of a “democratic para-
dox” (Mouffe, 2000), we are able to stress that democ-
racy actually ‘consists’ of several insoluble contradictions.
This statement does not deny that the concept of anti-
nomy linguistically overlaps with several similar notions
as paradox, contradiction, tension, opposition, aporia or
dialectic. But at least, one can say that by indicating a
‘law-like’ proposition, the application of the noun ‘anti-
nomy’ verbalises the character of irreconcilable (demo-
cratic) principles in the strictest sense. Hence, the ex-
istence of democratic antinomies might even be seen
as the fundamental reason for the inevitably resulting
paradoxes, contradictions, tensions, oppositions etc., in
democratic politics.
In accordancewith Kant’s definition of “antinomy” as
a “conflict of laws” (Widerstreit der Gesetze; Kant, 1911,
p. 407) leading to equally justified theses and antitheses
which cannot be resolved by a compromise or synthesis,
the identification of democratic antinomies primarily em-
phasises the underlying capacity of democracy to medi-
ate between obviously opposing but equally legitimate
principles. Though in Kant (1911, pp. 426–461), the iden-
tification of four (metaphysical) antinomies merges with
a critique of pure reason itself. With regard to the po-
litical idea of democracy, it is supposed to be evident a
priori that the historical discussion concerning the gov-
ernment of the people, by the people and for the peo-
ple has to be distinguished from the claim for pure and
absolute knowledge. Instead, the argument of demcratic
antinomies is not a transcendental one suggesting that
these antinomies did always exist. In contrast, the anti-
nomies of democracy do not imply a matter of logic but
only of semantics reflecting the contradictory meanings
being attributed to the idea of democracy during its con-
ceptual history and concluding from the relevant geneal-
ogy to the alreadymentionedmain quality of democracy:
the ability to subsume very contrary ideas and realities
under one and the same semantic field. Additionally, the
method of genealogy which has been applied in order
to detect democratic antinomies within the history of
political thought (Hidalgo, 2014) performatively implies
both a thesis that the hitherto identified six antinomies
cover the dominant historical debate on democracy and
a concession that the relevant discussion is always open
for supplements, advancements and the identification of
further democratic antinomies.
Proceeding from this, democracy can also be under-
stood as a basic idea or proposition from which further
propositions and their very opposites can be deduced
(cf. Müller, 2004, p. 516, footnote 6). Moreover, it is due
to its antinomies that democracy shapes an infinite num-
ber of disagreements, disputes, and conflicts since there
is never the one and only ‘democratic’ position but al-
ways a few or even a large number of alternatives for
how a particular political question can be treated and
decided. In addition and upon closer examination, the
unique framework of democracy, in which different po-
litical decisions are available by pursuing, for example,
liberty against equality, the individual against the com-
munity, quality against quantity or vice versa, is also a
consistent result of democratic antinomies: As long as
these one-sided political demands show respect for the
(normatively equivalent and only temporarily neglected)
other side of the opposition, the ‘democratic’ character
of the political process or debate is maintained in toto.
The latter is the case if a political demand or decision
does not abolish the opposition itself by pursuing ex-
treme objectives or denying the general entitlement to
opposing views. Hence, democracy means not least a
permanent struggle to bring or to keep its extremes
into a dynamic balance. This balance of democratic anti-
nomies should not be confused with the golden mean or
the desirable middle between two extremes. Instead of
falling prey to the fallacy of seeking the ‘truth’ as a com-
promise between two opposite positions, the theory of
democratic antinomies rather demands the coexistence
of the relevant extremes without signifying that the ex-
tremes are bad and the middle ground is good. Instead,
the ideal coexistence could be described as an indispens-
able oscillation of democracy and its processes of polit-
ical decision-making between its opposing principles. In
this respect, Claude Lefort’s conception of democracy as
a system characterised by both the institutionalisation of
conflict within society and themaintenance of an “empty
space” of political power might be a helpful illustration
(Lefort, 1988). In return, the possibility of a process of
‘sublation’ in the sense of Hegel that might unite and
keep both sides and reproduce the contradiction on a
higher level must be rejected from the perspective of
democratic antinomies.
Although each of the aforementioned six democratic
antinomies deserve a rather extensive reflection, it is cer-
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tainly the first one (between liberty and equality) which
needs the most clarification. At a first glance, the lib-
eral doctrines of John Rawls (1971) or Ronald Dworkin
(1981a, 1981b, 1987), combining both ideals as an in-
eluctable normative fundament of democracy, suggest
that liberty and equality do not inevitably mean insolu-
ble contradictions. However, a ‘real’ or ‘essential’ equal-
ity could only be achieved by repression since a free so-
ciety must necessarily evoke social differences, inequal-
ities, and hierarchies because of people’s different pro-
cedures, capacities, and interests. That is also the rea-
son, why liberals such as Rawls or Dworkin tend to re-
duce equality to a political or legal status and give pri-
ority to liberty, while social democrats conversely prefer
equality against liberty and therefore support redistribu-
tion of wealth and greater intervention by the welfare
state. Sometimes, it is even controversial to which camp
an author belongs. For instance, Rawls might rather be
assigned to the advocates of social democracy, since the
difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity
in the Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971) suggest the legit-
imacy of an expansion of the welfare state. However, it
is at least evident that Rawls was very aware of the fact
that liberty and equality remain contradictions, as he ar-
ranged his principles of justice in a lexical order prioritis-
ing the liberty principle and determining this priority if
the principles conflict in practice. In Political Liberalism,
the priority of basic liberties against equality is not only
confirmed (Rawls, 1993, Lecture 8) but intensified, as the
liberty principle as the equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties is replaced by only
an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal ba-
sic rights and liberties (Rawls, 1993, Lecture 8, Section 8).
Indeed, since democracy means both liberty and equal-
ity, both groups, liberals and social democrats involve the
first antinomy in their doctrines, while there is a never-
ending political struggle between the left and the right
concerning the necessary extensions and boundaries of
both concepts and, additionally, the adequate balance
of them.
A very similar thing regards the rather evident anti-
nomies between people’s sovereignty and representa-
tion, individual rights and collective duties, as well as
about the quantitative principles of participation and
majority rule on the one hand and the need for qual-
itative or normative measures to guarantee a partic-
ular output of political decision-making on the other.
Democracy always means and includes both contradic-
tory sides. Therefore, it is only complete if it does not
ignore any one of these components, although it is ob-
vious that democracy is unable to resolve the inevitable
tensions and paradoxes which result.
3. The Identification of Value Trade-Offs in Democratic
Politics
A trade-off is popularly known as a situational decision
that involves the gaining or growing of one quality or
quantity concerning a certain set or amount in return for
simultaneously losing or diminishing qualities or quanti-
ties in different aspects. Similar to the figure of a recip-
rocal or inverse proportionality, a trade-off is often com-
pared with a zero-sum game, in which each gain or loss
of one actor’s or group’s utility is balanced by or compen-
sated for by the gains or losses of other actors or groups.
Thus, in simple terms, a trade-off is commonly observed,
whenever the increasing of one thing is accompanied by
the decreasing of another.
The origins of trade-offs are numerous, including ba-
sic physical or biological reasons. In economic realms, a
trade-off is usually expressed in terms of the “opportu-
nity cost” a particular choice implies, which is equivalent
to the loss of or relinquishment of the best available alter-
native (Campbell & Kelly, 1994). Accordingly, the concept
of economic trade-offs indicates a strategic or tactical sit-
uation, in which relevant actors have to come to a deci-
sion by considering the advantages and disadvantages of
each alternative very carefully. In this respect, it could be
that the (economic) reasons considered affect the field of
ethics as well, which is particularly the case whenever a
trade-off concerns not only the various (or even conflict-
ing) interests and values of a single person but also the
competing interests and values of groups of people. It is
similar regarding situational decisions being defined by
the rivalry of different ethical principles as with deontol-
ogy and utilitarianism for instance.
On the surface, this general concept of economic
and ethical trade-offs dominates democratic politics
in an all-encompassing manner. As economic theories
of democracy—e.g., by Gary Becker (1958, 1983) or
Anthony Downs (1957a, 1957b)—insinuate, all politics
and processes of political decision-making might be in-
terpreted as an infinite series of trade-offs based upon
the interests and core values that political actors, politi-
cians, or just the majority of people share. However, the
economic theory of democracy in thewake of Becker and
Downs obviously fails in reflecting and understanding the
fourth democratic antinomy: between plurality and com-
petition on the one hand, andmodern democracy’s need
for social cohesion, political unity, and an imagined com-
munity in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1991), or the
previously mentioned “overlapping consensus” (Rawls,
1993) on the other. Hence, the question of trade-offs in
democracy is rather complex than in an economy and
must, therefore, go beyond the focus on politicians’ and
voters’ rational choices. In democracy, the role of pub-
lic good, as well as the principles of collective action and
the common identity of people, are directed against the
simplified notion that the ‘typical’ democratic situation
is that, in which one person’s gain inevitably means an-
other’s loss.
Nevertheless, the concept of trade-offs could be
adapted through the democratic antinomies approach in
a quite different way. An expedient applicationmerely re-
quires one to recognise the dual nature in the meaning
and impact of trade-offs in the field of democratic pol-
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itics. Instead of understanding trade-offs only in utility
maximising terms, inwhichmore of one good implies less
of another, the democratic antinomies do not predomi-
nantly concentrate on choices across competing goods
but on the need to find a balance between democracy’s
insoluble contradictions. Proceeding from this, the in-
herent ‘self-contradiction’ of the trade-off conception is
coming to the fore: On the one hand, a trade-off between
conflicting and even mutually exclusive alternatives in-
eluctably implies a constructive dealing, an arrangement
with the underlying, (almost) equally desirable options
for decision-making. Otherwise, situations which require
trade-offs would not happen at all. Moreover, as far as
this deal or arrangement avoids radical extremes (which
is apparently plausible since both sides of the trade-off
are positively connoted and every relevant decision be-
tween them had at least to guarantee the minor evil), it
could be described as a kind of agreement, anyway if we
want to call this more precisely an adjustment, a modus
vivendi, a compensation for asymmetries or even a prag-
matic compromise. On the other hand, no trade-off be-
tween such a set of alternatives would be able to solve or
overcome the underlying conflict of political aims, goals,
and objectives. At best, it might just be suitable to ensure
that the relevant political conflicts in democracy are de-
fused and unlikely to escalate.
As we have seen, the requisite balance of democ-
racy’s conflicting principles should not be confused with
the (dis)solution or ‘sublation’ of the conflict itself.
Instead, dealing with the indissoluble tensions and an-
tagonisms appropriately within democracy requires the
coexistence of contradictory (and conflicting) democratic
principles. Hence, the concept of a trade-off between the
democratic antinomies ensures both the respect of the
antinomies’ intrinsic character and an illustrative config-
uration in order to describe the (assumable) phenomeno-
logical hallmarks of democracy. Referring to this, the
three different levels and functions of trade-offs con-
cerning the theory of democratic antinomies can finally
be highlighted:
• First, one may say that the occurrence of trade-off
situations in democracy actually depends on the
condition that there are relevant public actors as
political parties, members of parliaments and can-
didates who are running for elections, citizen and
interest groups, as well as the media or judges,
who are able to articulate and represent the wide
range of legitimately conflicting principles and val-
ues within the democratic system;
• Second, and vice versa, the empirical existence
of trade-off decisions in democratic processes
provides a good indicator that the characteris-
tic antinomies of democracy are still present and
virulent. In contrast, a lack of trade-offs in any
political society would suggest democracy’s de-
cline to its inherently deficient, self-destructive
forms as for instance in illiberal or exclusive
democracies (Antinomy I), tyrannies of majority or
post-democracies (Antinomy III), as well as anti-
pluralistic democracies or cases of social disinte-
gration (Antinomy IV);
• Third, and finally, the concept of trade-offs of-
fers a heuristic pattern to describe generic polit-
ical, structural and institutional outputs of anti-
nomically organised democratic processes. In this
regard, the (six) democratic antinomies shown
in Section 2 evidently correspond with a jux-
taposition of concrete opposing characteristics
which empirical democracies ordinarily combine.
An overview is given in the following Table 1.
The table emphasises that due to the antinomies sev-
eral empirical trade-offs concerning evidently antithetic
structures and institutions are predestined within demo-
cratic societies. Concretely, the first antinomy between
liberty and equality pre-eminently leads democracy to
evoke essential affinities to both the freemarket and the
social state, whereas the second antinomy between rep-
resentation and popular sovereignty is translated into
the normative equivalence of parliamentarism and pop-
ular referenda, elections, and public debate in respect of
legislative processes. Moreover, the parallelism of influ-
ential power and lobby groups and the reverse validity of
the classical principle ‘one person, one vote’ is an expres-
sion of the first two democratic antinomies as well. In
Table 1. Trade-offs in antinomic democracy.
Democratic Antinomies Trade-Offs
I Liberty and equality Free market and social state
II Representation and popular sovereignty Parliamentarism and popular referenda
Interest groups and ‘one person, one vote’
III Quality and quantity Rule of law and majority rule
IV Plurality and unity Pluralism of opinions/lifestyles and collective identity
V Individual and collective claims Civil rights and duty of solidarity
VI Universality and particularity Global values/human rights and national interests
Similarity and dissimilarity of all democracies
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terms of the third antinomy between quality and quan-
tity as contradictory principles of all methods of demo-
cratic decision-making, there is a further antithetic coex-
istence of majority rule and the rule of law to be noticed.
And while the fourth antinomy provokes a salient clash
of pluralistic opinions and lifestyles on the one hand and
an efficacious collective identity of people on the other,
the fifth antinomy finds its trade-off in the simultaneous
validity of civil rights and the duty of solidarity. Last, but
not least, we can conclude from the sixth antinomy be-
tween universality and particularity that a similar colli-
sion between national interests and global responsibility
of a democratic association occurs. In addition, this anti-
nomy includes as a further paradox that every democ-
racy is inevitably both similar and dissimilar to all other
(empirical) democracies because they all reflect a par-
ticular will of their people as well as also having a sub-
stantial affinity to universal claims and values such as hu-
man rights.
Although these trade-offs cannot be measured with
methods of mathematical exactness, which might be a
feature of alternative approaches to eliciting value trade-
offs in politics (e.g., Baron, 2000), quantifiable indices for
measuring goods being implicit to antinomic democratic
principles as liberty and equality are definitely available.
However, since the theoretically identified (semantic)
antinomies of democracy cannot be reformulated (and
therefore be resolved) by the distinction of a meta lan-
guage and an object language following Alfred Tarski’s
concept of truth in formalised languages, the resulting
trade-offs in practice affect a subject beyond mathemat-
ical axiomatics, arithmetic, and particularly equivalence
aswell. Therefore, value trade-offs due to the democratic
antinomies approach obviously cannot indicate (the in-
tervals of) zero-sum games in a strict sense, since the
antinomies cannot be enunciated by linear and inverse
mathematical functions. But apart from that, the scheme
above gives us a comprehensive impression of the pro-
totypical value conflicts in modern democracies. For in-
stance, the ferocious debate between the advocates of
open borders, multiculturalism, and the right to immi-
grate as the only morally acceptable position for some-
one committed to democratic values (e.g., Carens, 2013)
and their opponents who stress democracy’s need for
national identity and the legitimate interest of any po-
litical community in self-determination (which includes
launching a rather restrictive immigration policy, e.g.,
Miller, 2016) is a perfect example of an argumentative
trade-off in respect of the fourth and sixth antinomy.
Moreover, the controversy between liberals and commu-
nitarians regarding the relationship between the individ-
ual and their community could easily be reconstructed
in terms of the first and fifth antinomy. Hence, Section 4
of this article will discuss three further issues in order
to strengthen and illustrate the assumed nexus between
democratic antinomies in theory and value trade-offs in
political practice.
4. Three Issue Areas
4.1. Freedom and Security
Since its inception, the modern democratic state stands
for an evident trade-off between freedom and security.
The institutional guarantee of civil rights and liberties
protects the citizens from state despotism, while the se-
curity of the state can reciprocally be seen as a precon-
dition of people’s freedom. Moreover, checks and bal-
ances, as well as people’s (indirect) contribution to the
implementation of laws, mean that the legislative power
generally provides a framework of private liberties which
the largemajority of citizens feel is justified. But although
freedom and security might (andmust) complement one
another, both principles, at least within democracy, are
equally the components of a trade-off similar to a zero-
sum game. Self-autonomy and civil liberties are factually
limited whenever the security of the state is effectively
or virtually threatened. In return, democratic states have
to accept surveillance gaps or incomplete control of their
people in order to guarantee civil liberties.
Likewise, themaintenance of an at least unstable bal-
ance of freedom and security is one of the greatest chal-
lenges of the democratic state, since each social, eco-
nomic, or political crisis is usually succeeded by a signif-
icant increase in state power and a restriction of free-
dom at the same time (e.g., Cobden, 1973; Higgs, 1987).
Today, particularly the phenomenon of transnational ter-
rorism tends to disturb or even destroy any trade-off be-
tween freedom and security. Basically, the transnational
terrorist represents in a special sense amaximumof free-
dom and, inversely, a minimum of security. Comparable
to a freedom fighter, the terrorist exhibits only few re-
gards to his personal safety forcing the authority of the
state to tighten counter-measures permanently. In the
worst case, security fanatic politicians and citizens are
even willing to sacrifice (all) civil liberties, which are as-
sumed to endanger the survival of the state. In fact,
democratic states often over-react to the risks of transna-
tional terrorism (e.g., Art & Richardson, 2007; Jacobson,
2006). Hence, the democratic rule of law is under ongo-
ing risk of becoming replaced by a ‘state of prevention’
which would be equivalent to a triumph of security over
the freedom of democracy.
Undeniably, it was the theoretical thinker Thomas
Hobbes, who first reflected on the antinomic founda-
tions of the trade-off between freedom and security
in the modern democratic state in 1651. However, in
Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651/1996), the common argument,
that there is no security without a significant restraint
of freedom, had already been taken to its extremes. In
Hobbes, the collective power of people represented by
a single sovereign aims to ensure that all or at least
the majority of citizens equally benefit from law, order,
and security, while all other sides of the democratic anti-
nomies (I to V)—individual rights, people’s sovereignty
and participation, the rule of law, freedom and plural-
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ity (including a separation of powers)—are neglected. In
other words, Hobbes’ refusal to accept any trade-off be-
tween freedomand security likewise rejected democracy.
Accordingly, the theoretical accomplishment of a balance
between the relevant antinomies of democracy and par-
ticularly a trade-off between a guaranteed individual
right to freedom and the collective interest in security
(Antinomy V) was only achieved by his successors, e.g.,
Locke, Montesquieu, Kant or the Federalists. In practice,
the antinomic trade-off between freedomand security in
democracy demands that both principles remain under
reservation of the other. Since a concrete state interven-
tion either increases freedomor security, the relevant de-
cisions should not focus on only one side of the paradox
but need respect for both sides, which means nothing
less than the underlying antinomies must be maintained.
Otherwise, there is the risk that freedom is sold out for
security or vice versa. Both alternatives—the obsession
for a secure state or to have an anarchy—would be in-
compatible with democracy. Moreover, the democratic
trade-off between security and liberty illustrates the fact
that dissolving antinomies to one side might finally elimi-
nate both sides, since erasing all security does not mean
maximising liberty and, on the contrary, without secu-
rity, there is no liberty at all. As it has been mentioned
above, the reason for this is that, outside democracy, the
identfied antinomies never lead to trade-offs similar to
zero-sum games, since democracy depends on a (posi-
tive) coexistence of its opposing principles. Thus, the sum
of them cannot be zero there, whereaswithin democracy
(and beyond the undemocratic, one-sided extremes), it
is very plausible that one can only increase one side of
an antinomy by decreasing the other. This strengthens
the argument that there is generally a need for trade-offs
in democracy. In return, the trade-off between freedom
and security advances to a measurable empirical quality
of democratic antinomies.
4.2. Economic Growth and Sustainability
Thebasic principle of sustainable development is tomeet
“the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
(World Commission on Environment and Development,
1987, p. 41). This obligation towards sustainability origi-
nally attempted to combine the aspects of an intergener-
ational justice (Rawls, 1971, Chapter 5, Section 44) and
a common responsibility for poverty reduction and envi-
ronmental protection with a commitment to economic
growth as a condition for global welfare. However, the
conservation of natural resources and livelihoods on the
one hand and social progress, productivity increases, and
growth in global incomes on the other have meanwhile
been proved as rather conflicting goals (e.g., Jackson,
2009; Latouche, 2009). In this matter, as things stand
today, the prospect of “green growth” or “green capi-
talism” (e.g., Ekins, 2011; Fay, 2012; Heal, 2010; OECD,
2011) has to be estimated as very uncertain.
Once again, democracy is basically predestined to of-
fer a discursive framework to negotiate an appropriate
trade-off in this matter. But unfortunately, the demo-
cratic antinomies suggest sustainability being rather a
structural deficit of democracy itself. Three main prob-
lems can be identified in order to grasp the reasons for
this deficit systematically:
• In contrast to the theory and practice of ancient
democracy (e.g., Finley, 1985), the powerful posi-
tion of individuals inmodern democracies requires
and principally justifies the absence of a general
priority of community and collective aims over in-
dividual rights and claims (Antinomy V). In conse-
quence, a (temporary) subordination of individual
interests, e.g., in the society’s economic growth
and welfare, might still be possible if there are
good and traceable reasons. Nevertheless, a just
virtual community of future generations is appar-
ently too ‘weak’ in order to avoid the well-known
“future-individual-paradox” (Parfit, 1983) and to
enable such a withdrawal of current desires in
favour of future goals;
• Although it is plausible, that, in democracy, envi-
ronmental protection and the claim for sustainabil-
ity acquires the quality of being an elitist or avant-
gardist issue, it could hardly be expected to be-
come a mass phenomenon (Antinomy III). Instead,
the majority of people have been unwilling to re-
nounce on their own rational advantage promised
by economic growth;
• An additional focus on the levels of the democratic
antinomies II and IV gives further rise to the suspi-
cion that the interest in sustainability and the con-
servation of natural resources is structurally under-
represented in (Western) democracies. The main
challenge is that there is not one single acting sub-
ject, one interest group of really concerned and af-
fected people who are able to give environmental
issues an unambiguously audible voice within the
polyphonic choir of pluralistic democracy.
Thus, as Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America
(1840/2002) has already pointed out, we are confronted
with the inconvenient insight that, particularly in democ-
racy, citizens usually do not cultivate the capacity to re-
nounce their current needs and desires in favour of fu-
ture prospects, chances, and obligations. The reason is
obviously that, at least according to the consistently large
majority of people, the issue of sustainability is not recog-
nised as a normatively equivalent goal to the principle of
economic growth. From this, against the background of
the democratic antinomies approach, we could conclude
that the antinomic conditions to achieve a balance or
trade-off between the conflicting objectives—economic
growth and sustainability—yet are not given. In conse-
quence, as long as there is not an efficacious social “imag-
ination” (Castoriadis, 2006) that present and future gen-
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erations have to be considered as ‘equal’ (Antinomy I),
while people ignore the fact that the contributors to cli-
mate change and environmental pollution from the in-
dustrialised countries bear a particular responsibility for
those suffering the consequences in developing coun-
tries (Antinomy VI), a significant improvement of the con-
temporary ecological situation will remain out of reach.
Therefore, in case of sustainability and economic growth,
the theory of democratic antinomies even provides a
benchmark, regarding the reform, efforts and institu-
tional innovations which eventually have to be done in
order to include all concerned parties in the controver-
sial democratic discourse.
4.3. Populist Democracy
For the final example, we have initially to elucidate to
what extent the theory of democratic antinomies serves
as a reference point to understand the synchronic pop-
ulist and non-populist character of democracy. Instead
of encouraging a problematic separation between pop-
ulism as a (thin) political ideology (e.g., Mudde, 2004)
and as only a style of political communication (e.g.,
Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Taggart, 2000), the democratic
antinomies approach underlines that democracy always
includes two effects: first, a substantial alignment to pop-
ulist strategies, whenever only one side of its contra-
dictory and conflicting principles is getting accentuated;
and second, an effective resistance to such one-sided ap-
pearances of populist democracy by cultivating its non-
populist counter-principles at the same time.
The following chart (Table 2) illustrates these populist
and non-populist sides and features of democracy due to
its several antinomies: Here, the left hand side of the first
column consisting of the principles of liberty, representa-
tion, quality, plurality, individual rights, and universality
suggests that one half of democracy shows deep affinity
to liberal and non-populist values; whereas the italicised
right-hand side of the first column (assembling the norms
of equality, popular sovereignty, quantity, homogeneity,
collective claims, and particularity) indicates that the sec-
ond half of democracy can barely be distinguished from
the prototypical principles of political populism (e.g., De
La Torre, 2015;Mudde, 2004, 2007; Priester, 2007, 2012).
In accordance with that, the table’s second column
alleges the kind of politics a (populist) dissolution of
each democratic antinomy (suppressing the liberal side
of democracy while enforcing its illiberal one) must obvi-
ously lead to. As a result, which is apparently very close
to the empirical programs and rhetoric of many right and
left-wing populists in European and American democra-
cies, a form of populist or illiberal democracy emerges
which fails to ensure the necessary balance or trade-off
between the relevant liberal and illiberal opposing prin-
ciples. Such a populist or illiberal democracy, which is
most of all characterised by a very one-sided empha-
sis on equality, popular sovereignty, majority rule, social
homogeneity, and the particular interest of the political
community, implies both a remaining affinity to demo-
cratic principles and their parallel degeneration. In de-
tail, the populist denial of the existence of a trade-off
between the liberal and the illiberal side of democracy
provokes typical political phenomena such as:
• Sweeping defamation and condemnation of estab-
lished political classes and active political profes-
sionals, often accompanied by a strong vindication
of social security (Antinomy I);
• The advocacy of a rather limitless sovereignty
of people which is emplaced against representa-
tive institutions, political elites and corporations
(Antinomy II);
• An unleashed and destructive rule or even a
tyranny of majority preventing a possible self-
containment of democracy by the rule of law
(Antinomy III);
• The enforcement of a homogeneous collective
identity of people due to nationalist, culture-
specific, or religiousmatters at the charge of plural-
istic or multicultural requirements (Antinomy IV);
• The strict superiority of the political community
over individual rights (including harsh polemics
against liberal achievements in modern democra-
cies particularly in the field of anti-discrimination
of women, homosexuals, religion, foreigners and
coloured people; Antinomy V).
In sum, the populist reason tends to overrule all sides
of democracy showing affinity to universal values. In re-
verse, it forces all opposite sides of the antinomies to
guarantee the particular national interest of their own
democracy (Antinomy VI).
Table 2. Biased populist democracy with lacking trade-offs between democratic antinomies.
Democratic Antinomies Imbalance/Lacking Trade-Offs
I Liberty and equality Defamation of established political classes and politicians
II Representation and popular sovereignty General critique on elites, corporations, and institutions
III Quality and quantity Tyranny of majority
IV Plurality and homogeneity Anti-pluralism and strict friend/enemy distinction
V Individual and collective claims Anti-modernism (including gender- and homophobia)
VI Universality and particularity Radical nationalism/chauvinism
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Hence, a populist democracy in the rough sense
builds a very biased form of a democratic order, not
by attacking directly the liberal sides of democracy but
by overemphasising or absolutising its populist coun-
terparts. In contrast to this, every functioning democ-
racy must remain able to keep its inherent populist ele-
ments in a balance or trade-off with non-populist and lib-
eral institutions and principles. In other words, the pop-
ulist side definitely belongs to democracy (e.g., Laclau,
2005) and might even function as a correction to liberal
democracy because populism enables it to renew itself
against its own post-democratic and technocratic ten-
dencies whenever such biases have not been spotted by
the liberal side of democracy (e.g., Mouffe, 2018;Mudde
& Kaltwasser, 2012). But, at the same time, populism al-
ways undermines democracy, since all democratic princi-
ples need to be balanced by their antinomic counterparts
and would act against democracy if the (liberal) counter-
principles were destroyed.
At a first glance, Table 2 and the ensuing argument
in Section 4.3 shows indeed only tendencies or prob-
abilities and therefore must necessarily be seen as a
limited argument. Considering this objection, it is true
that, for instance, there are a couple of populist move-
ments (e.g., the Tea Party in the United States or the
Progress party in Norway) pursuing not an egalitarian but
rather an anti-welfare and pro-liberty agenda. Moreover,
not all populists are homophobic (e.g., the former Pim
Fortuyn list in the Netherlands) or chauvinistic (e.g., left-
wing populists as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain).
Nevertheless, the antinomic tension between the ‘lib-
eral’ and ‘illiberal’ parts of democracy can be observed in
these special cases as well. Since illiberal politics should
not be confusedwith strict anti-liberal positions butmust
rather be understood as an abuse or exploitation of lib-
eral institutions in favour of illiberal purposes, an illiberal
agenda of radical ‘liberalism’ is apparently as plausible
as an illiberal suppression of minorities by other minori-
ties. Hence, the countless examples and differences of
populist parties and programs have to be analysed from
case to case; but in general, the explanatory power of
the democratic antinomies approach is not reduced too
much thereof.
5. Conclusions
This article has applied the concept of value trade-offs in
order to get a rather empirical benchmark for illustrating
the political implications of democratic antinomies. In re-
turn, the democratic antinomies approach is able to give
the relevance of trade-offs in political realms a theoreti-
cal basis. More precisely, it should have become evident
how the democratic antinomies approach serves as an
adequate reference point to identify the specific value
trade-offs which are necessary within the political arena
of democracy in order to keep its potential to degener-
ate in check. Therefore, it is vital to democracy that its
genealogically recognised antinomies are never resolved
in such a way as to abolish oppositions or possibilities for
new (and always temporary) resolutions.
In this respect, the three examples concerning free-
dom vs. security (Section 4.1), (short-range) economic
and (long-range) ecological goals (Section 4.2), and, fi-
nally, this issue’s area of populist democracy (Section 4.3)
might suggest that the particular antinomic trade-offs in
democracy demand less of a compromise but rather a
peaceful coexistence to balance different but equally le-
gitimate objectives. This means (and enables) that there
be an only temperate articulation of political goals as
well as a demonstration of substantial respect to the an-
tagonistic positions of political opponents.
In sum, the identified trade-offs concerning the anti-
nomies of democracy confirm that it is mostly not pos-
sible to accomplish all beneficial political goals at the
same time. But, metaphorically speaking, it must never-
theless be guaranteed that all governance and politics
in democracy provide a permanent symbolic ‘presence’
of these democratic values being occasionally and tem-
porarily ‘absent.’ Even though this only offers a very pre-
liminary perspective on how to balance the goods im-
plicit in democracy’s antinomies rather concretely, what
has been achieved here in identifying value trade-offs as
logical outcomes and requirements of the relevant the-
ory in political practice might become helpful in order to
fulfil this need in the future.
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